May 30
Civil Unrest
AFTER-ACTION REVIEW

City of Cleveland

Mayor Frank G. Jackson
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An Important Message from the City of Cleveland

Dear Residents,

On May 30, 2020, the City of Cleveland experienced civil unrest the likes of which it had not seen for decades. Residents and visitors came to the downtown area to protest the death of George Floyd, an African American man who died at the hands of police officers in Minneapolis, Minn. five days earlier. Similar protests were seen throughout the country as Americans were shocked, saddened and angered by his death.

We recognize that the events of the day started as a peaceful protest of societal ills and that violence is the symptom of a deeper societal ailment. In order to truly address crime and the criminal justice system, we must also identify solutions to eliminate inequities, disparities and racism – which requires all of us to make successful inroads.

The demonstrations in downtown Cleveland began peacefully on May 30, 2020, with many citizens assembling at the Free Stamp sculpture with signs and banners. The City of Cleveland continues to commend and support those who choose to express their First Amendment rights peacefully and lawfully. Throughout the course of the day, events escalated to civil unrest that culminated in violence and property damage throughout the area.

Following the institution of a downtown curfew and the restoration of order, a complete after-action review was ordered as an analysis of the collective response to this incident by the Cleveland Division of Police. After-action reviews are conducted on many high-profile police involved incidents and prove helpful in identifying areas needing improvement as well as strategies that can be proactively adopted into future plans. This comprehensive review includes analysis of data, intelligence, deployment strategies, radio communications, police reports, body worn camera footage and other materials pertaining to May 30, 2020.

Frank G. Jackson
Mayor, City of Cleveland

Karrie Howard
Director of Public Safety

Calvin D. Williams
Chief, Division of Police
INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 2020, at approximately 1 p.m., a public demonstration was held in the City of Cleveland to highlight the circumstances surrounding the death of George Floyd. Organizers planned for the event to start at the Cleveland Free Stamp sculpture, located in Willard Park at East 9th Street and Lakeside Avenue. At 1:30 p.m., approximately 1,000 demonstrators gathered in the area. During the demonstration, participants marched westbound on Lakeside Avenue to the Justice Center (JC), eventually surrounding the complex. Over the next several hours, the initially peaceful demonstrations turned violent. The incident escalated from a peaceful protest to individuals engaging in criminal acts, including arson, vandalism, burglary and assaults on police officers. In the end, rioters overran the peaceful participants who intended to have their voices heard.

Mayor Jackson, Chief Williams, then-Assistant Director Howard and Chief of Communications and Government & International Affairs Valarie McCall were detailed to the Emergency Operations Center throughout the incident. Then-Safety Director Michael McGrath and Fire Chief Angelo Calvillo were in the field.

After discussing with Mayor Jackson, Cleveland Division of Police (CDP) Chief Williams ordered a complete after-action review, including information gathering and analysis of the Division's response to the May 30 civil unrest and more generally, to provide context on that day's events. This reflective analysis, along with identified successes, failures and recommendations, may provide other law enforcement agencies and members of the community with an understanding of the challenges faced by the Division during its response, and the confidence that there will be continuous improvement in how the Division serves the citizens of Cleveland.

METHODOLOGY

In the days following May 30, 2020, CDP initiated efforts to document all aspects of the civil disturbance event and the response of all involved law enforcement. Information from a variety of sources was obtained and analyzed and serves as the basis for this review. The collection and analysis of data began in the days after the incident. The data included, but was not limited to, the following:

- Communication logs from police radio
- Officer reports and Form-1 Memoranda
- Recorded radio traffic which spanned from May 30th, 10 a.m. until May 31, 5 a.m.
- Wearable Camera Systems (WCS) (i.e., body-worn cameras)
- News and social media reports and posting
- Internal intelligence from members of CDP
- A two-day after-action review with the Cleveland Division of Police Command Staff, supervisors from the Division of Police, the Chief of the Division of Fire, members of the East Cleveland Police Department, the Ohio State Highway Patrol, Cleveland Office of Emergency Management, and several regional SWAT teams. Retired Lt. Col. Michael Black of the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) facilitated the after-action review.

Where times were conflicting, radio dispatch time was used.
George Floyd, an African American male, died on May 25, 2020 while in the Minneapolis Police Department’s custody. His death sparked outrage and protests in the City of Minneapolis and around the country. Minneapolis enlisted the assistance of outside agencies including the National Guard. On May 28, groups of protestors overran a police precinct in Minneapolis and set the building on fire. Civil unrest in Minneapolis lasted for weeks, while individuals in other U.S. cities began taking to the streets to protest Floyd’s death.

Over the next several days, protests in Columbus, Ohio, turned violent when protestors stormed the capital building doors and damaged downtown property. In Atlanta, police cars were set on fire, and property was destroyed as civil unrest continued to spread to New York, Philadelphia and Washington D.C. At least 4,400 people have been arrested across the country for alleged offenses ranging from aggravated riot, theft and breaking curfew.

As civil unrest continued to expand around the country, 62,000 members of the National Guard were activated in over 24 states, including Ohio. While 40 U.S. cities imposed a curfew, protests spread internationally, including Spain, Brazil, Kenya, Australia and the Netherlands.

In recent years, the City of Cleveland experienced several large-scale public protests or events during which generally peaceful protestors or crowds gathered on city streets. Cleveland Police has and will continue to support citizens’ rights of free speech and assembly, and actively protect people exercising those rights.

These events included, but were not limited to:

- In May 2015, widespread demonstrations occurred in downtown Cleveland after the acquittal of Michael Brelo. Brelo was on trial for voluntary manslaughter in the deaths of Timothy Russell and Malissa Williams. Their deaths resulted from a police vehicle pursuit, which ended in an officer-involved shooting.

- In December 2015, protestors rallied downtown after a grand jury declined to indict Timothy Loehmann, the officer who shot and killed Tamir Rice. Rice was killed after officers responded to a male with a gun in the park adjoining the Cudell Recreation Center on Cleveland’s West Side. After the shooting, the officers discovered that Rice had a pellet gun.

- In June 2016, over one million people assembled in Downtown Cleveland to celebrate the Cleveland Cavaliers winning the NBA championship. Residents and visitors packed the streets to celebrate. During this celebration, there were no significant incidents and one arrest.

- In July 2016, thousands of people from around the world assembled downtown to protest during the Republican National Convention (RNC). Officers, including mutual aid assistance from around the country, protected the rights of those peacefully convened without significant unrest or lack of order.
The Division has not experienced civil unrest of the size or scope of the May 30 events since the 1960s. Since that time, CDP's mission during protests, planned or unplanned, has been to protect constitutional rights and all those seeking to gather peacefully to bring awareness to their cause, no matter the topic.

The Division seeks and maintains relationships and partnerships with all Clevelanders. Therefore, when community members peaceably assemble, the Division unequivocally provides logistical support as needed including street closures, officer presence and maintenance of general safety.

When planning for such gatherings, particularly those that seek to draw attention to high profile and emotional events, the Division weighs the need to protect the participants against the need to be visible and provide general security. The Division also balances the rights of those to assemble peacefully with the rights of others to move freely on public roads and pedestrian ways.

Ultimately, planning for such events is a culmination of information gathering and intelligence from members of the Cleveland community, event planners and multiple levels of law enforcement. CDP also considers historical circumstances in the City of Cleveland and past planned/unplanned events to help drive its planning functions.

Additionally, the Division values and respects that Cleveland is a unique and diverse city. It cannot be assumed that our community will respond in the same way as other locations or jurisdictions when civil unrest occurs. When the Division plans for high profile events, as much information and intelligence as possible are gathered, and all functions within the Division are planned accordingly. The initial Event Action Plan for the May 30 events was based on information and intelligence known at the time in the City of Cleveland.

The initial rally proved to be peaceful, in line with that intelligence. Unfortunately, events rapidly escalated without forewarning and turned violent.

This after-action report details that initial planning, the events of the day, and the Division’s multi-phased responses.

"Cleveland is a unique and diverse city. It cannot be assumed that our community will respond in the same way as other locations or jurisdictions when civil unrest occurs."
CLEVELAND BASED INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO MAY 30, 2020

The following information was provided by the Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (NEORFC). Between Dec. 1, 2019, and May 29, 2020, the NEORFC researched and disseminated information on four events located at the Cuyahoga County Justice Center. Three of those four happenings pertained to groups speaking out against corrections officers or the jail conditions concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.

The NEORFC also researched and disseminated information to all partner agencies on approximately seven additional events within the City of Cleveland during the same timeframe. The NEORFC sent out a series of updates regarding the demonstration scheduled for May 30 (Exhibit A – NEORFC Intelligence Briefings).

Please see the below dates, names, and locations of the events. The following incidents only include events in which the NEORFC identified and disseminated formal findings. They do not include pop-up events or other events that the NEORFC researched.

- 12/31/2019: “Candlelight Rally for Homeless” (then-Councilwoman Dona Brady's residence)
- 01/04/2020: "US Troops Out of Iraq and Syria" (Market Square)
- 01/06/2020: "City Hall Sit-In: No More Freezing to Death in Cleveland" (City Hall)
- 01/06/2020: "City Council Meeting" (City Hall)
- 01/18/2020: "Walk for Puerto Rico" (Corner of Barber and W. 25th)
- 03/08/2020: "2020 International Women’s Day March Cleveland-City Hall-March 8" (City Hall to Public Square)
- 05/29/2020: “I Can’t Breath” Justice for George Floyd (Free Stamp Monument)

Dates of events located at the Cuyahoga County Justice Center:
- 03/09/2020: "Pack the Court for Chantelle Glass."
- 05/29/2020: "Compassion Over Cages: Action."
- 05/29/2020: "Protest in Cleveland To Alert Judges & For Ohio Prisoners"
LOCATION & SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

In response to the death of George Floyd on May 25th, 2020, a group of protestors planned an assembly in Downtown Cleveland at the Free Stamp monument located on Lakeside Avenue at East 9th Street, scheduled to commence at 2 p.m. on May 30th. Below is a timeline of events, before, during, and after the incident. The following timeline is not an all-inclusive list of every action that occurred that day. Wearable camera systems and police dispatch time are captured from different time zones resulting in a confliction for data collection. As such, when a conflict occurs, the dispatch time is used.

May 30: 10 a.m. to Noon

- At 10:29 a.m., Communications Control Section (CCS) received a call from an individual indicating that she heard protestors are coming from Solon, South Euclid and Euclid. She stated that the youths are responding from all over and that more than just Cleveland Police should be sent in response.
- At 10:54 a.m., all radio channels were advised to send units to assist with the demonstration.
- At 10:57 a.m., District 1 reported they had no zone cars to send.
- At noon, the Mobile Command Vehicle went operational with an additional dispatcher monitoring the channel.

May 30: Noon to 2 p.m.

- At noon, a police dispatcher opened up an active channel at the Mobile Command Bus.
- Also at noon, a roll call was held at the Third District Police Headquarters. Present at roll call included Neighborhood Impact Community Engagement Unit (NICE), Bike Unit, Traffic, District 3, District 4, Intelligence Unit and Bureau of Community Relations. The Incident Commander (IC) briefed members on their duties and the Event Action Plan (EAP). By 12:45 p.m., all members were present at their assignments.
- Pursuant to Division Policy, the IC made contact with the event organizer. The organizer stated there were several planned speakers at the Free Stamp with no plans to march.
- Due to the large volume of people at the Free Stamp, at 1:06 p.m., the Traffic Commissioner (TC) closed Lakeside Avenue between E. 9th Street and East 6th Street. Additionally, Westside Drive was closed except for the Willard Garage.
May 30: 2-3 p.m.

At 2:43 p.m., the group was in front of the Hilton Hotel (100 Lakeside Ave E). They passed Ontario Street and continued westbound on Lakeside Avenue. As a result, the Traffic Controller posts on St. Clair Avenue at West 6th Street and West 9th Street were closed for northbound traffic. Additionally, the Route 2 eastbound exit ramp to West 6th Street/Lakeside Avenue was closed to clear traffic from Lakeside Avenue.

At 2:46 p.m., most of the participants stopped in front of the north side of the JC while a smaller group turned from Lakeside Avenue and headed southbound on West 3rd Street. As a result, Rockwell Avenue at West 3rd Street was closed to traffic.

The group went east on West St. Clair Avenue at 2:48 p.m. and, at 2:49 p.m., headed north on Ontario Street. As they marched eastbound on West St. Clair, several of them kicked an unoccupied marked police vehicle sitting near the ramp to the JC.

At 2:50 p.m., the group split with some remaining on Ontario Street while others headed east on Saint Clair Avenue.

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At approximately 2:40 p.m., the demonstrators at the Free Stamp began to march. Smaller groups split from the larger group and marched in different directions. The bulk of demonstrators assembled on the north side of the Justice Center from Ontario Street to West 3rd Street. Most remained there during this period. Other groups were on the east and west sides and moved periodically. In addition to these groups, others remained mobile and marched in various directions throughout the downtown area.

At 2:40 p.m., the group marched from the Free Stamp westbound on Lakeside Avenue. The majority of the demonstrators remained with the larger group. Additionally, people who were not a part of the initial demonstration arrived and joined the group from multiple directions.

Also, at 2:40 p.m., the Traffic Commissioner ensured that all streets were closed around the JC.

At 2:43 p.m., the group was in front of the Hilton Hotel (100 Lakeside Ave E). They passed Ontario Street and continued westbound on Lakeside Avenue. As a result, the Traffic Controller posts on St. Clair Avenue at West 6th Street and West 9th Street were closed for northbound traffic. Additionally, the Route 2 eastbound exit ramp to West 6th Street/Lakeside Avenue was closed to clear traffic from Lakeside Avenue.

West Lakeside Avenue at West 9th Street was closed eastbound.
By 3 p.m., more than 1,000 demonstrators assembled at the JC. Several groups were moving in various directions, while the main group was mostly stationary. During this period, some protestors became violent, throwing hard items at officers and damaging property. Some protestors had items such as: baseball bats, frozen eggs, frozen fruit and vegetables, fireworks, frozen water bottles, hammers, milk jugs, oven mitts, wasp spray, a leaf blower and other items. CDP and Cuyahoga County Sheriff's deputies formed a skirmish line so that the faction of increasingly hostile protestors could not enter the JC. As officers and deputies held the line, protestors pelted them with various items and threatened bodily harm. As this type of behavior escalated, on-scene officers prepared to respond and munitions were requested. As most CDP resources were redeployed to the JC, Traffic Units redeployed officers and controllers to divert as much vehicular traffic away from downtown as possible. Also, during this time, many protestors became rioters and the IC initiated reading the dispersal orders.

Between 3-3:10 p.m., the following took place:

- CDP members working undercover (UC) stated that there was talk within the main crowd that there would be an attempt to get into the Justice Center and “free the prisoners.”
- A Sheriff’s Deputy reported that protestors were hitting the windows at the north entrance of the Justice Center with bats, fists and other objects in an attempt to make an entry.
- Officers broadcast that “They are throwing stuff, we do not have near enough people.”
- An officer transmits that the crowd is throwing garbage cans.
- At 3:09 p.m., the Traffic Commissioner stopped all vehicular traffic from traveling around Public Square and westbound on Superior Avenue.
- The Mobile Field Force (MFF) Commander ordered a skirmish line. The Bike Group formed a line between the protestors and the Justice Center. There were many hard objects thrown at them, including frozen water bottles, frozen eggs, a punctured can of Wasp spray and glass bottles.
- An officer reported the Bike Group was trapped in front of the Justice Center and was requesting assistance.

The Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) was contacted at approximately 2:59 p.m. to have units relieve the motorcycle units blocking freeway ramps.

At 2:59 p.m., part of the group broke away and headed southbound on West 3rd Street from Lakeside Avenue.

**May 30: 3-4 p.m.**

- The Deputy Chief of Field Operations ordered all body-worn cameras to be activated.
- Fifteen officers from the Patrol Section arrived to assist on Lakeside Avenue in full personal protective equipment (PPE).

Left: Law enforcement and officers line the street along Lakeside Avenue. (Courtesy photo)
By 3:12 p.m., the intersection at Ontario Street and Rockwell Avenue was blocked by protestors.

By 3:20 p.m., a large group of protestors assembled at Public Square and blocked all of the surrounding intersections.

At 3:21 p.m., the following took place:

- Officers reported getting attacked as soon as they arrived downtown.
- Protestors attacked a cargo van used by District 3 CSU and occupied by one officer. While the officer was still inside, they spray painted it, broke the back window, entered through the rear door, and stole equipment.
- The Bike Unit on the west side of the Justice Center reported they were being overwhelmed.
- A Third District supervisor requested permission to use Blast Balls if necessary and pursuant to the policy.*
- The IC, transmitted, do nothing until the dispersal order is read.

Between 3:30 and 3:44 p.m., the following took place:

- There was a broadcast of a male wearing a black mask throwing an object under a black Chevy Impala.
- Officers at the Justice Center reported the crowd was throwing hard objects, wrenches and glass bottles and request assistance to step it up.
- At 3:37 p.m., the IC read the first dispersal order (Exhibit B – Dispersal Order). The IC was located in front of the Justice Center on Lakeside Avenue. The IC was using a Division-issued megaphone to read the order.
- An officer transmitted that he was struck with a glass bottle on Lakeside Avenue.
- At 3:38 p.m., the IC read the second dispersal order. The IC was located in front of the Justice Center on Lakeside Avenue. The IC used a Division-issued megaphone to read the order.
- There was a constant barrage of hard objects, such as frozen water bottles, frozen eggs, metal wrenches, and frozen vegetables thrown at the officers holding the field force line. Officers transmitted via radio they were being struck with these objects, causing non-debilitating injuries.
- At 3:40 p.m., the IC read the final dispersal order. As the IC read the dispersal orders, some in the crowd became louder, trying to drown her out.
- At 3:40 p.m., the MFF Commander stated, “Squad 3, per the DC, display the Mark 9s. Pull them out of the bags, display only.”
- At 3:41 p.m., the MFF Commander stated, “The IC, per the Chief, break out the grenadier bags and pepper balls. Use as necessary to push them back.”
- Multiple officers reported issues with opening their pepper ball canisters. To direct crowd action, CDP and the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department grenadiers released munitions including but not limited to pepper spray and Blast Balls.

* Cleveland Division of Police Divisional Notice 16-178, Controlled Item Operation and Guidelines (E115) Munitions
Protestors pulled parking signs out of the ground and swung them at officers.

Per the MFF Commander, the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Deputies deployed pepper balls.

A protestor struck an officer on the hand with a bat, forcing him to drop a canister of pepper spray. The protester then picked up the dropped munition and sprayed the officer.

Protestors used a launcher to launch rocks and frozen water bottles.

Protestors shined a green laser pointer at the officer’s eyes.

At or near 3:44 p.m., the MFF Commander stated, “All squads: mask up. Get ready to launch munitions.”

At 3:44 p.m., the largest group remained at the JC, although another large group was at Public Square. Additionally, a large group was on Ontario Street in front of the entrance to CDP Headquarter.

At 3:46 p.m. hours, the group in front of headquarters became increasingly volatile and officers requested an MFF Squad and Grenadiers’ assistance.

At 3:47 p.m., the Public Square group began to march east on Superior Avenue.

At 3:52 p.m., CDP and OSHP closed the Detroit/Superior Bridge.

At approximately 3:53 p.m., there was a large group at E. 12th Street and Superior Avenue.

At 3:53 p.m., the Public Square group was at E. 12th Street and Superior Avenue, then headed south on E. 12th Street.

By 3:55 p.m., the Traffic Unit ordered the closing of all intersections on E. 9th Street.

At or near 3:55 p.m., the MFF Commander told the grenadier team that all of their less than lethal munitions were approved for use.

At 3:57 p.m., the Public Square group began to march east on Superior Avenue.

May 30: 4-5 p.m.

On or about 4 p.m., there were three main groups of demonstrators and mobile demonstrators surrounding the Justice Center. The largest group was on the north, east and west sides of the Justice Center. Another group in and around Public Square marched to E. 12th Street and Superior Avenue, where they split and formed a third group. Some of the Justice Center group began throwing hard and soft items at officers and damaging property. As a result, munitions were deployed. During this time, the Traffic Units continued to move to various locations to limit vehicle traffic and protect uninvolved motorists.

At 4 p.m., the Public Square group of protestors on E. 12th Street split. The first group headed north on E. 12th Street, the other, east on Euclid Avenue.

At 4:02 p.m., on the north side of the JC, rioters attacked a cargo van used by District 3 CSU and occupied by one officer. While the officer was still inside, they spray painted it, broke the back window, entered through the rear door, and stole equipment.

At 4:04 p.m., the second group headed west on Prospect Avenue from E. 14th Street.
At 4:08 p.m., the CDP helicopter (Aviation Unit) reported a large crowd moving westbound on Lakeside Avenue from East 9th Street. Also, at 4:08 p.m., CDP closed the Lorain/Carnegie Bridge.

At 4:09 p.m., the TC requested that OSHP close all freeway ramps into downtown.

At around 4:10 p.m., rioters set two unoccupied police zone cars on fire at W. 3rd Street and Lakeside Avenue.

Between 4:10-4:13 p.m. the following took place:

- Chief Williams ordered assistance from half of all district personnel. He also ordered them to be dressed and ready in full PPE.*
- Safety Director McGrath requested assistance from the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) Police, OHSP and the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) Police.
- Communication Control Section broadcasted that there should be no police cars in the immediate area. The officers shall park their vehicles and walk down West 3rd Street.
- Undercover detectives report protestors are threatening to attack the West 3rd St. Deli.
- The CDP helicopter stated it was watching the West 3rd St. Deli, and that there was a group of people there with more coming that way. There was a second group marching east on Superior Avenue from Public Square.

By 4:13 p.m., a small group of demonstrators returned to the Free Stamp. They were not aggressive and mostly peaceful.

At 4:16 p.m., rioters damaged a Traffic Control van.

At 4:17 p.m., the Cleveland Division of Fire (CDF) attempted to put out the zone car fires. Rioters surrounded the fire apparatus and damaged it, leaving it unable to put out the fires. The CDF reported that they could not put out the fire without the assistance of officers. Being unable to dedicate officers and CDF confirming that nothing else will burn as a result, Chief Williams ordered CDF out of that area.

At 4:18 p.m., an unknown male placed a black bag under a black car.

At around 4:19 p.m., rioters damaged several privately owned vehicles on W. 3rd Street.

Between 4:27-4:34 p.m., the following took place:

- Rioters broke windows on the west side of the Justice Center. People jumped on police cars on the west side of the Justice Center.
- The IC reported that a rioter in the crowd on the north side of the JC pointed a green laser light officer's eyes.
- Males were reportedly on St. Clair Avenue with a bottle of gasoline.
- A male was reported to be mixing something in a white container behind the Cuyahoga County Courthouse. The male ran away when approached by police.

At 4:34 p.m., the Deputy Chief of Field Operations reported a zone car on fire in front of the JC.

At 4:40 p.m., Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority Police arrived to assist.

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* Cleveland Division of Police General Police Order Crowd Management and the Protection of Constitutional Rights 3.3.03 (IV, B, 4)
At 4:45 p.m., a rioter broke the windows of several businesses on W. 6th Street at Johnson Court.

At 4:47 p.m., several people parked their vehicles on Eastbound Rt. 2 at W. 3rd and filmed the riot.

At 4:53 p.m., individuals broke the glass on the guard shack on the south side of the St. Clair Avenue ramp to the Justice Center and set a fire at the Justice Center on West 3rd Street and Lakeside Avenue.

At 4:57 p.m., the IC reported that rioters again used the green laser in the officer's eyes.

By 4:58 p.m., rioters were reported on the roof of Karl’s Inn of the Barristers on W. 3rd Street at Lakeside Avenue.

**May 30: 5-6 p.m.**

By 5 p.m., CDP had made significant progress in moving rioters away from the JC’s front doors and onto the sidewalk/street on the north side of the complex. Its Traffic Unit continued to close intersections, but CDP deployed multiple mobile units which began to make arrests. Unfortunately, several dozens of groups were spread throughout Downtown Cleveland. Additionally, rioters set numerous fires and damaged property.

At 5:04 p.m., there were reports of someone with a baseball bat at West 3rd Street and Lakeside Avenue trying to break out a window of the Justice Center.

At 5:07 p.m., rioters attempted to set a fire on W. 2nd Street, north of Rockwell Avenue.

At 5:09 p.m., a Traffic Controller reported that a group of protesters placed several water jugs on St. Clair Avenue at West Mall Drive.

At or about 5:12 p.m., a group of rioters moved to Tower City (230 W Huron Rd.) Officers working secondary employment reported that rioters were trying to gain entry into Tower City and requested assistance. They also said that males with baseball bats broke out front doors at Tower City and that several had gained entry and were attempting to go into the Casino.

At 5:15 p.m., a large group formed in front of the CDP Headquarters on Ontario Street at St. Clair Avenue.

Two males wearing masks threw H1000 fireworks at the police. Officer reported some in the crowd threw mortar shells.

By 5:27 p.m., a Mobile Field Force Squad attempted to assist at Tower City. They reported that rioters threw fireworks (H1000) and mortars at them.

At 5:29 p.m., a male attempted to set fire to several garbage cans at W. 4th Street and St/ Clair Avenue.

At 5:30 p.m., a large crowd gathered at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument in Public Square at the corner of West 3rd Street and Saint Clair Avenue.

At 5:39 p.m., officers assigned to the Bike Group arrested an individual at 1200 Ontario St. for Aggravated Riot and Assaulting a Police Officer.

At 5:40 p.m., the Mobile Command Vehicle dispatcher reported that a possibly black male was struck with a rubber bullet. It was later determined that the incident happened at W. 3rd Street and West St. Clair Avenue.
At 5:41 p.m., rioters broke windows on West 6th Street at Saint Clair Avenue.
By 5:45 p.m., Traffic Controllers diverted all traffic around Public Square away from the area.
At 5:49 p.m., the Public Safety Director ordered the full activation of the EOC, and critical personnel were requested to go to the EOC.
At 5:50 p.m., RTA discontinued all trains from stopping at Tower City.

At 5:52 p.m., rioters set fire to a trash can on Ontario Street in front of the Medical Mart.
At 5:53 p.m., a CDP lieutenant requested EMS for a 17-year-old female that was having trouble breathing.
At 5:57 p.m., an officer transmits that, “The County Sheriff’s telling us that they’ve made [it] inside of the JC.” Then, at approximately 5:59 p.m., the same officer transmitted the following: “81 to Command Bus.” After the Mobile Command Vehicle dispatcher responded with “Command bus. Go ahead.,” the officer stated: “County Sheriff’s saying they’ve made it inside the JC, they’re in the County Clerk’s Office, they’re trashing the place.” It was later determined that a CDP officer relayed this information by request from an unknown Sheriff’s Deputy.

May 30: 6-7 p.m.

By 6 p.m., wide-scale rioting was happening all over the downtown area. There were several dozen groups of various sizes, setting fires and damaging property. The CDP made significant progress quelling the rioting around the Justice Center and was able to redeploy units throughout downtown. The Bike Group and multiple Mobile Field Force Units put out small fires with handheld Cold Fire extinguishers and made several arrests. Additionally, police officers, Fire and EMS personnel were attacked by rioters as they responded to several locations. During this time frame, the number of people grew as people who were not originally part of the protest converged downtown. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Mayor Jackson spoke with Gov. Mike DeWine about activating the National Guard in Cleveland.

At around 6 p.m., an officer reported that a male was walking northbound on W. 3rd Street toward W. St. Clair wearing a ballistic vest with a semi-automatic weapon strapped to him, and possibly with a concealed handgun. Officers later made contact with the male, who was checked.
At around 6:06 p.m., rioters set fire to a car outside the Justice Center. It was later determined to be a bailiff’s vehicle. Weapons were reportedly stolen from the bailiff’s car.
At 6:10 p.m., officers arrested an individual for Aggravated Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest at 1300 Ontario St.
At 6:11 p.m., a Motorcycle Officer who was blocking an intersection reported that vehicles, including a white motorcycle, were driving at him directly to get through the blockade.
At 6:13 p.m., a different Motorcycle Officer who was blocking another intersection reported that a red motorcycle refused to stop and drove past him doing wheelies heading toward the inner perimeter.
At 6:14 p.m., some protesters made it into the Justice Center (County Clerk’s office). There were reports of males vandalizing the third floor.

At 6:18 p.m., three CDF trucks attempted to get to St. Clair Avenue and Ontario Street to put out fires. Rioters attacked the trucks throwing bottles and rocks to prevent them from reaching the fires. The Mounted Unit attempted to assist, but rioters attacked them as well. Traffic Unit officers assisted the Fire Trucks and the Mounted Unit to back out of the location.

At 6:20 p.m., 10 males with baseball bats reported by the Blue Point Grill at 700 W. St. Clair Ave.

By 6:25 p.m., rioters broke windows of the Key Bank at Rockwell Avenue and Ontario Street.

At 6:22 p.m., rioters set fire to a trash can at the southwest corner of Ontario Street and Saint Clair Avenue.

At 6:24 p.m., rioters set fire to several Bailiff vehicles at West 4th Street at Lakeside Avenue.

By 6:25 p.m., rioters broke windows of the Key Bank at Rockwell Avenue and Ontario Street.

By 6:26 p.m., the Traffic Commissioner redeployed Traffic Controllers away from the rioters for fear of their safety.

At 6:27 p.m., rioters at Public Square destroyed many of the bus shelters around Public Square.

At 6:29 p.m., rioters broke the windows of the Jack Casino and made entry. Also, at this time, the West 3rd Street Deli owner exited his store and was immediately surrounded by rioters.

At 6:33 p.m., there was a broadcast of several businesses on fire on Euclid Avenue and Ontario Street. Additionally, there were reports of protestors breaking windows of businesses on Euclid Avenue and Ontario Street.

At 6:34 p.m., rioters attempted to light the West 3rd St. Deli on fire.

At 6:37 p.m., members of the East Cleveland Police Department arrived to assist.

At 6:38 p.m., rioters entered the Cleveland Clothing Co. store at 342 Euclid Ave.

At 6:40 p.m., a Chevy Tahoe drove recklessly around officers at Ontario Street and St. Clair Avenue.

At 6:40 p.m., dispatch received a call reporting shots fired at the Colossal Cupcakes at 528 Euclid Ave. At 6:42 p.m., dispatch received a call indicating the employees locked themselves in the bathroom. Later, an officer reported that there was a shot fired into the store.

At 6:43 p.m., an off-duty officer reported that approximately two dozen males walked southbound on W. St. Clair Avenue breaking out windows.

Around 6:44 p.m., a large group began running up W. 4th Street from West Lakeside Avenue.

By 6:48 p.m., a large group of people riding All-Terrain Vehicles approached downtown.

At 6:49 p.m., there were reports of looting at CVS (Euclid Avenue & East 8th Street).
At 6:51 p.m., four white males openly carrying long rifles and wearing camouflage clothing walked west on St. Clair Avenue towards E. 9th Street.

At 6:56 p.m., Chief Williams ordered officers to arrest anyone vandalizing property.

May 30: 7-8 p.m.

By 7 p.m., widespread rioting and looting had taken place from E. 13th to W. 9th streets and from Lakeside to Prospect avenues. Rioters attacked anyone who attempted to quell the violence or put out fires. CDP's MFF and Bike Group, along with partner agencies, fanned out to quell the violence while Traffic Units redeployed to limit vehicular traffic. Unfortunately, a continual influx of new people made the estimation of participants impossible, and the suppression of violence more difficult. Furthermore, rioters began attacking civilians. As groups of officers formed a ring around the JC, they were attacked by a constant barrage of glass bottles and hard objects. Chief Williams redeployed forces to repel entry into the facility, protect the officers that formed the line, and systematically quell the violence.

At 7:08 p.m., rioters lit a fire inside Starbucks (W. 6th & Frankfort streets).
At 7:10 p.m., rioters entered the Thirsty Parrot (812 Huron Rd.) and went to the building roof.
At 7:13 p.m., rioters set a fire inside a building at W. 3rd and W. St. Clair.
At 7:15 p.m., Mayor Jackson signed an emergency proclamation mandating a curfew for the Central Business District and part of the Ohio City neighborhood. (Exhibit C – Proclamation of Civil Emergency)
Between 7:14-7:16 p.m., the following took place on W. 4th Street between West Lakeside and West St. Clair avenues:
- A Motorcycle Unit officer arrested a male.
- Rioters set a garbage can on fire.
- There was a report of four males with long rifles on W. 4th Street heading north.
- The arrested male was taken to the JC for booking.

At 7:21 p.m., rioters looted Flannery's (E. 4th Street & Prospect Avenue). Additionally, rioters broke windows and knocked over trash cans around Ontario Street and Prospect Avenue.

At 7:24 p.m. the following occurred.
- A crowd set a car on fire at East 9th Street and Euclid Avenue.
- Rioters entered the PNC bank and attempted to set it on fire.

At around 7:30 p.m., the officers made the following arrests:
- At E. 4th Street and Prospect Avenue: Aggravated Riot (one individual).
- At 1300 Ontario St.: Aggravated Disorderly Conduct (one individual).
- At 310 W. St. Clair Ave.: Aggravated Riot and Vandalism (one individual).

At 7:31 p.m.:
- There was a friendly fire incident in front of the JC involving an officer getting hit in the hand with a direct-impact sponge round

At 7:34 p.m., rioters looted the XO Steakhouse (500 West St. Clair Ave.). The looters threw stolen bottles of alcohol at officers.

At 7:34 p.m., rioters broke more windows on the Lakeside Avenue side of the JC.

At 7:37 p.m., several vehicles sped and did “burnouts” with their tires around Ontario Street and St. Clair Avenue.

At 7:41 p.m.:
- Rioters threw glass bottles at police horses at Ontario Street and St. Clair Avenue.
- At 205 St. Clair Ave., a crowd attempted to light a car and the Justice Center on fire.

At 7:42 p.m., Chief Williams ordered more officers to the JC.

At 7:43 p.m., rioters at W. 3rd Street and St. Clair Avenue threw glass bottles at officers and attempted to turn a vehicle over.

At 7:45 p.m., the injured officer was transported to St. Vincent Charity Hospital (2351 E. 22nd St.).

At 7:50 p.m., undercover officers reported that a group of rioters planned to go to Steelyard Commons at approximately 9 p.m. The Commander of the Second District was notified.

At 7:54 p.m., a male with a gun and a male with a fire extinguisher broke out windows of civilian cars that drove by.
Around 7:55 p.m., the following took place:

- Dispatch reported that 100 people were attempting to get into the Jack Casino.
- Looters enter Boost Mobile in Public Square and used boards to break windows at Tower City.
- Rioters set fire to a construction trailer at West 4th Street and St. Clair Avenue.

May 30: 8-9 p.m.

By 8 p.m., full-scale rioting and looting increased as rioters damaged more property, set more fires and attacked civilians. The curfew began, and CDP and partner agencies were dispersed through the downtown area quelling the violence, putting out the smaller fires and making arrests.

The curfew began at 8 p.m.

- Around 8 p.m., officers arrested an individual at 205 W. St. Clair for Failure to Comply, and another at W. 3rd St. and Saint Clair Ave. for Aggravated Disorderly Conduct.
- At 8:01 p.m., a Motorcycle Officer was informed by a civilian that rioters had removed people from their vehicles.
- At 8:02 p.m., officers assisted EMS to Jakes Sandwich Shop (140 Public Square) because they could not get to a 60-year-old patient.
- At 8:03 p.m., a crowd attacked an EMS Supervisor at E. 4th Street and Euclid Avenue.
- At 8:06 p.m., the Sheriff’s Office deployed their prisoner bus. Also, at this time, the Traffic Unit blocked vehicular traffic on St. Clair Avenue from E. 9th to Ontario streets.
- At 8:07 p.m., many rioters damaged the business on E. 4th Street between Prospect and Euclid avenues and entered the Chocolate Bar at 347 Euclid Ave.
- At 8:09 p.m., an officer reported that a female walked south on E. 9th Street towards Euclid Avenue, falsely stating to the rioters that the police just killed someone. He then stated that some of the rioters began jumping on top of civilian vehicles.
- At around 8:15 p.m., groups of rioters of various sizes spread throughout the entire downtown area. The largest groups were on St. Clair Avenue from W. 3rd Street to Ontario Avenue, and on Euclid Avenue, from E. 4th to E. 9th streets. Chief Williams deployed officers to concentrate on both areas. The largest concentration of officers was deployed to St. Clair Avenue, including partner agencies and the CCSO Prisoner Bus. When all of the officers were in place, the Field Force began to systematically arrest individuals and push the remaining out of the area. The Bike Group was deployed to the Euclid Avenue area to assist the MFF Units already there. Around 8:17 p.m., at W. 3rd Street and W. St. Clair Avenue, officers arrested seven people for Aggravated Riot and one person for Failure to Comply.
- At 8:19 p.m., rioters looted the Corner Alley and House of Blues (E. 4th Street & Euclid Avenue) and took bowling balls and other items.
- At 8:20 p.m., a large group of rioters ran east on Chester Avenue from Euclid Avenue. Also, at this time, dispatch reported that a male was threatening with a gun at the Arcade (401 Euclid Ave.).
At 8:21 p.m., OSHP brought in more Troopers to block highway off-ramps.

At 8:23 p.m., rioters attacked Fire trucks and officers with bats and bottles at East 9th and Euclid. At this time, the number of rioters in this group grew, and the attacks intensified.

At 8:24 p.m., the following took place:
- Rioters set a guard shack on fire on Frankfort Avenue between W. 6th and W. 9th streets.
- Civilian cars drove towards officers on W. 3rd Street from Lakeside Avenue.
- Rioters attempted to set the Jimmy Johns restaurant on Public Square on fire.
- Chopper verified that the largest group of rioters were concentrated at E. 9th Street and Euclid Avenue.

At 8:26 p.m., rioters began to break windows at E. 12th Street and Chester Avenue.

At 8:28 p.m., rioters looted the Heinen’s market located at 900 Euclid Ave.

At 8:30 p.m., an undercover officer reported a male at the corner of St. Clair and Ontario avenues, attempting to light something on fire.

At 8:32 p.m., an alert about the curfew order was sent out over the Wireless Emergency Alert System and Emergency Alert System to the Downtown Area. At 8:55 p.m., the alert was expanded to include the entire City of Cleveland. The Cuyahoga County Office of Emergency Management also sent out a mass notification to the entire county, notifying all residents of the downtown curfew.

At 8:33 p.m., several vehicles were doing “burnouts” and speeding at the Public Square. As a result, the Traffic Commissioner requested the RTA PD to respond to Public Square.
Between 9 p.m. and midnight, the looting and rioting continued. However, CDP and partner agencies made progress on suppressing the violence by making arrests and limiting foot and vehicular traffic. The curfew was fully implemented, and the number of people downtown diminished considerably.

- At 9:03 p.m., Chief Williams ordered officers to arrest anyone out after curfew.
- At 9:04 p.m., undercover officers reported that rioters were yelling “Steelyard” several times to the other participants.
- At 9:10 p.m., rioters set fire to garbage cans at E. 9th Street and Prospect Avenue.
At 10:02 p.m., rioters entered the Ohio Savings Bank at 1801 E. 9th Street.

Rioters set fires near the Soldiers and Sailors monument

At 9:23 p.m.:
- Reports of people getting into Progressive Field.
- Rioters set fires near the Soldiers and Sailors monument
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At 9:15 p.m., the Traffic Commissioner broadcasted that the vehicular traffic within the inner perimeter was under control.

At 9:17 p.m., rioters set fire to several garbage cans in the middle of the Public Square.

At 9:18 p.m., a crowd tried to overtake a fire truck at 820 Prospect Avenue.

At 9:24 p.m., rioters looted a Platinum Rim and Tire Shop at 2245 E. 14th Street.

At 9:30 p.m., rioters looted the CVS Store at 1400 E. 9th Street. Also, at this time, an intoxicated female fell and landed on glass shards, causing numerous injuries on E. 4th Street at Euclid Avenue.

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By midnight, CDP and partner agencies had largely quelled the mass rioting and looting. Between midnight and 2 a.m., the number of people downtown was minimal, and Command began to relieve personnel systematically as there were no new fires or property damage. In less than nine hours, the Division and its partners had regained the stability of the downtown and surrounding areas.

At 12:01 a.m., the demobilization process began.
At 12:04 a.m., all day shift Traffic Controllers were relieved.
At around 12:12 a.m., an individual was arrested by officers at Prospect Avenue and Huron Road for Failure to Comply.
By 12:28 a.m., all day shift officers assigned to the Bureau of Traffic were relieved.
Around 12:30 a.m., officers arrested an individual for Failure to Comply at 1041 Huron Rd.
At around 12:45 a.m., officers arrested another individual for Failure to Comply at E. 14th Street and Euclid Avenue.
At 12:59 a.m., Districts 2, 3 and 5 were relieved by the MFF Commander.
Around 1 a.m., officers arrested two people for Breaking and Entering at 2056 E. 4th St.
At 1:05 a.m., the Mobile Command Vehicle was relieved by the Incident Commander.
At 1:06 a.m., OSP starts to reopen ramps but still patrolling area for the next two hours.
At 1:08 a.m., an unidentified male requested EMS in connection with OC/Taser deployment.
At 1:15 a.m., District 4 "B" platoon was released.
At 1:28 a.m., all undercovers complete for the night.
May 31: 2-5 a.m.

By 2 a.m., the great majority of civil disorder and criminal acts were over, there were very few people left in the downtown area, and most of the officers assigned to the detail had been relieved. By 5 a.m., the IC secured the detail.

- At 2:50 a.m., the IC ordered District 5 MFF to remain on the scene until the National Guard arrives.
- At 3:45 a.m., officers arrested an individual at 24 Public Square for Breaking and Entering.
- At 4:06 a.m., District 4 was released.
- At 4:59 a.m., SWAT was released.
- At 5 a.m., detail secured.

ARRESTS

- Seventy arrested between 3:30 p.m. Saturday, May 30th and 4 a.m. Sunday, May 31st
- Thirteen arrested individuals were indicted for felony charges, and two are pending
- Three arrested individuals are charged with felony federal charges
- Eighteen of the arrested individuals went in front of a special Grand Jury presented by a task force of detectives. These detectives have also charged 26 of the original arrests

Above: A protester throws a large object in Downtown Cleveland during the May 30 civil unrest. (Courtesy photo)
ITEMS USED BY RIOTERS

Some of the identified objects that the rioters used against officers and property are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hands and feet</th>
<th>Gallon jug of milk</th>
<th>Metal wrench</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rocks/Bricks</td>
<td>Frozen eggs</td>
<td>Accelerants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>Street signs</td>
<td>Laser light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>Traffic cones</td>
<td>Fireworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water bottles</td>
<td>Baseball bat</td>
<td>Trash cans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frozen water bottles</td>
<td>Surveillance cameras</td>
<td>Hammers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass bottles</td>
<td>Pepper spray</td>
<td>Leaf blower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TACTICS USED BY RIOTERS

- When the IC was reading dispersal orders, the crowd became louder to drown her out.
- When an officer deployed OC spray at the crowd, rioters struck the canister or the officer's hand.
  When the officer dropped the canister, the rioters picked it up and used it against officers. Additionally, when officers deployed the OC spray, rioters grabbed the canister to stop the spray from dispersing.
- Rioters used a battery-operated handheld leaf blower to blow OC and Smoke.
- The IC observed some sort of launching mechanism used by rioters to launch objects at officers.
- Rioters used rocks and frozen bottles to reach officers from a distance and at a faster speed.
- A rioter used a green laser pointer to shine in officers' eyes.
- As the confrontation escalated, rioters formed a line using non-violent protestors to act as a barrier between them and officers. This line blocked officers from seeing and getting to the rioters who were throwing several objects at them. The rioters designed this tactic to prevent the officers from being able to stop the constant attack from the items that were thrown. This tactic also made it difficult to see who was throwing objects at the police lines, including various hard items.
- Another tactic identified was that those planning bad acts masked the actual number of people coming to the protest. As a result, the Division's early response to the event was limited. The original numbers appeared to be a few hundred protesters initially, but the numbers reached into the thousands shortly after. Additionally, after the event started, people converged on the protest from all areas of the downtown area, stretching police resources assigned to secure the event.
- When the zone cars were damaged and then set on fire, there were several attempts to put them out. Each time an effort was made, the rioters converged on them and attacked.
- Members of the crowd had orange traffic cones. When officers deployed OC munitions, rioters would cover it with the cone, pick it up and throw it back at officers.
- The OC and Smoke munitions burn hot. Many rioters had oven mitts, gloves, or bandanas used to pick up deployed munitions and throw them back at officers.
The original Event Action Plan for the protest included a complement of officers based on intelligence gathered and a dialog with the event planners. Based on evolving intelligence the day before and the morning of the event, the Division learned that the number of participants was expected to increase. As such, the Division continued to increase the number of officers assigned to the demonstration. By the time the event was in full swing, the Division had called for more officers to assist, including getting officers to work on their day off. They accomplished this while ensuring that enough officers were available to maintain full services throughout all of the City’s neighborhoods. Below is an explanation of the financial toll expended as a result of the riot on May 30th.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUDGET: CDP</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Personnel Worked:</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sworn</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime Worked:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Officers</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours</td>
<td>3,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$149,256.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sworn Work Day:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total X-Time</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total WDO</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Furlough Day Worked</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
COMPLAINTS

The Internal Affairs Unit received eight complaints relating to the events on May 30, 2020. Of those, one was sent over to the Cuyahoga County Sheriff department for investigations as it was their officer. Four are currently under review at the county prosecutor's office, the remaining are still open and will be presented to the city prosecutor for review.

The CDP Inspections Unit stated that no complaints were received/recorded from the events on May 30, 2020.

The Office of Professional Standards reported they received 12 complaints from citizens about officer behavior during the events on May 30.

The complaints alleged the following:
1. Excessive use of force
2. Harassment
3. Missing Property
4. Unprofessional conduct

MUTUAL AID

The City of Cleveland thanks the following agencies that provided mutual aid support:
1. East Cleveland Police Department
2. Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Office
3. Ohio State Patrol
4. EDGE SWAT
5. WEB SWAT
6. Ohio National Guard (activated)
Planning

Training & Policy

Positive Actions Identified About Training and Policy:

1. Beginning in January 2020, members of the CDP Mobile Field Force (MFF) began quarterly training. The Division implemented the training program before the COVID-19 restrictions to prepare for the upcoming Presidential election. The MFF includes the following units:
   - All District
   - Community Services and Vice Units
   - The Bike Group
   - The Ordnance Unit
   - The Gymnasium Unit

2. The training included the following:
   - Mobile Field Force formations
   - Arrest team techniques
   - Munition Deployment (grenadiers)
   - Bike Group formations and deployment
   - Tabletop exercises (TTX) for a large scale riot for supervisors

3. The Mounted Unit trains weekly in crowd management and performed exceptionally well managing the crowd on the east side of the Justice Center building.

4. As the events of the day escalated, officers assigned to the Patrol Section were mandated to assist downtown. They acted upon their previous training and performed well.

Areas for Improvement in the Training and Policy Processes:

1. Some members of the Patrol Section had not received MFF training since 2015 and had not practiced the use of their PPE. This deficiency was evident as the officers arrived. Many were unfamiliar with the use of their gear, creating a significant delay in responding to specific locations to manage the crowds.

2. Many officers arriving from the Patrol Section did not have or were not issued gas masks.

3. Leading up to the RNC, the CDP conducted many mass MFF training sessions but did not include Intelligence Officers, SWAT and Counter Assault Teams (CAT) and undercover units into field force exercises. These groups typically work together in non-violent special events throughout the year that do not require PPE or munitions to manage the crowd.

4. Unfamiliarity with the Incident Command System (ICS) resulted in unfilled Command positions and the inability to expand in ICS as crowds migrated to multiple locations.

5. CDP currently does not train with CFD or Cleveland Emergency Medical Services (CEMS) for non-violent or violent crowd management events.

6. On June 13, 2016, the Cleveland Division of Police instituted General Police Order 3.3.03 Crowd Management and the Protection of Constitutional Rights. Relevant policies for crowd management are being reviewed and updated.
Recommendations to Improve Training and Policy:

1. Create one dedicated MFF per district.
2. Create an on-call 80-member Bike group for crowd management. Members would be dedicated to only MFF or Bike groups and could not be in both units to stop depleting resources for significant events. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Conduct training for all groups quarterly and a mass training conducted bi-annually.
4. Purchase gas mask fit testing equipment and fit test members of the Division. (IMPLEMENTED)
5. Conduct interagency training with partner agencies. (IMPLEMENTED)
6. Review the Crowd Management GPO to ensure that it reflects the best practices going forward, specifically, munition deployment and force reporting.

Event Action Plan

Positive Actions Identified in Creating the EAP:

1. Intelligence about the planned protest was found on the internet by the Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (day and time).
2. The original EAP was created and distributed on May 28, 2020, at 1:14 p.m. It consisted of a basic package of the Bike Group, Nice Unit, and two MFF Squads from Districts 3 and 4. Also included were the Aviation, Mounted, Traffic Intelligence, and SWAT Units, and the K-9/Bomb Squad.
3. As more information came into the Fusions Center on May 29, the following updates occurred:
   - Chief Williams and the Deputy Chief of Field Operations increased the number of officers assigned to the event.
   - The remaining district CSU and Vice Units, the Gang Impact, Narcotics, Raven, Gym, Range, and Academy Units, were added to the plan.
   - Additionally, the Chiefs ordered all districts to hold over their dayshift officers and bring in all off duty officers assigned to all B-platoons.
   - The IC added a staging area for the influx of officers arriving to assist with the increasing protest numbers.

Areas for Improvement in Creating the EAP:

1. The start time for the detail was scheduled only one and a half hours before the protest.
2. Even though the Incident Commander, Operations, and Planning Chiefs were aware of the additional personnel, the EAP was not updated or distributed to reflect the supplementary assets.
3. Patrol section supervisors did not receive the EAP before the protest. They only received information on where to report for staging and what equipment to bring.

Recommendations to Improve the EAP:

1. The operational period for massive preplanned protests should begin at least 3 hours before the event to allow more flexibility for the Incident Commander and Operations Chief. (IMPLEMENTED)
2. Update the EAP when personnel is added to or removed from the plan and distribute immediately. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Commanders and Captains will receive the EAP and brief all members assigned to the event. (IMPLEMENTED)
Staging of Assets

Positive Actions Identified in the Staging of Assets Process:

Based on relationships built with local businesses over the years, CDP used privately-owned locations to stage assets. The Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Second District CSU Unit commanded the primary staging location. The OIC received personnel and instructed officers where to deploy and what gear to utilize. He also updated the IC of all arriving units and when they were ready for deployment.

Areas for Improvement in the Staging of Assets:

1. Officers responded to the staging location and could not immediately locate the OIC, causing a delay in reporting to their posts.
2. Even though the original plan was updated to include more officers, the number of officers was insufficient to fulfill the original mission due to the intent of the violent demonstrators.
3. The Bike Group is a part-time voluntary entity that has had difficulty in staffing significant events with enough riders. Additionally, they are to be a temporary barrier between protests/rioters and the location/structure/people that are the focus of their attention. Unfortunately, the Bike Group became a long-standing barrier between the rioters and the Justice Center. Also, since the original deployment posture did not cause them to be in their protective gear, they were vulnerable to the bottles of water and ice, rocks, frozen fruit, and other hard and incendiary objects thrown at them.
4. After the rioting began and the Justice Center became the focus of attention, officers instructed to stage there were cut off and unable to gain entry. The staging location was not changed, so officers were left to push their way through the rioters as best as possible to replenish the skirmish lines.

Recommendations to Improve the Staging of Assets:

1. Ensure that officers added to the detail and ordered to report to the staging location can readily locate the OIC. (IMPLEMENTED)
2. Make sure that there is a sufficient number of officers staged before the event. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Train more Bike officers and provide them with the opportunity to stage by other means than riding their bike. Additionally, place their protective gear in a location that can be readily accessed. (IMPLEMENTED)
4. Ensure that protest EAPs have a minimum of two staging areas identified. This staging area would be staffed by a logistics section chief and officers to protect the site. (IMPLEMENTED)

Command & Control

Incident Command System (ICS)

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a standard organizational structure. ICS is typically structured to facilitate activities into major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, Intelligence & Investigations, finance, and administration. It is a basic form of incident management to enable incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident — often under urgent conditions — without sacrificing attention to any component of the command system.
Positive Actions Identified as a Result of the ICS:

CDP continues to use ICS for all planned special events and protests since 2016. All officers in the Division have successfully passed ICS 100 (Introduction to the Incident Command System). Some supervisors assigned to the rally have advanced training in ICS, Field Force Command and Planning, Field Force Operations, and numerous other levels within ICS. Officers assigned to work special events/protests regularly are very familiar with ICS. The familiarity allowed those officers to understand where orders and commands were coming from and led to success in particular locations.

Areas for Improving the use of the ICS:

1. Officers not generally assigned to special events were not well versed in how ICS worked and were looking for direction from their direct supervisor, who, while trained, may have little to no experience with an ICS deployment. As a result, this led to delays of action and movement at times.
2. The Incident Commander (IC) oversees the entirety of the plan and is responsible for moving assets to places of need. As the crowd grew and focused their attention on the Justice Center, the IC could not get to a position where she could manage the entire operation. Typically, the Division placed the IC on the ground and where crowds concentrate their attention. As a result, the IC could no longer command the incident. The circumstances forced her to become the Operation Chief of the Justice Center.
3. As a result of the IC becoming the Operations Chief, other commands had to shift to cover the shortfall. Chief Williams became the Incident Commander, and the Deputy Chiefs took control of different geographic locations. Unfortunately, some of them did not know where many of the assets were moved and often requested resources unavailable. Once enough personnel had arrived at the staging areas and became equipped, Chief Williams was able to send officers to other locations.
4. At the end of the operational period, the demobilization process was deficient. There were weaknesses in returning vehicles and tracking supplies and personnel.

Recommendations to improve ICS Effectiveness:

1. Train all officers and supervisors in higher levels of ICS and train them every year in its application. Supervisors assigned to large scale events should be required to attend FEMA training in Incident Command, Field Force Command and Planning, Logistics Chief, Planning Chief, and Safety Officer. This specific training will help all officers' to understand the ICS platform. All ICS protocols should be followed to better plan, track, supply, and demobilize significant events.
2. The IC or their designee will be stationed in the command bus or the EOC. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. All Command Level supervisors should attend two Tabletop Exercises (TTX) yearly to maintain command and control of large scale operations. Participating in this training will allow Command Level supervisors to keep within the ICS structure and not revert to rank. Elicit the assistance of the FBI, who often writes TTXs.
4. Create a FEMA structured de-mobilization plan and process. (IMPLEMENTED)

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The EOC is a centralized facility from which interagency coordination and executive decision making can occur to support incident response activities regarding life safety, incident cost, incident stabilization, and preservation of property and the environment.
The primary activities that occur within the EOC include, but are not limited to: incident command, facilitation of situational awareness through the establishment of a common operating picture, setting priorities, policy establishment, maintenance and management of communications, internal and external information, resource identification, allocation, tracking, and record maintenance in support of the incident response.

Positive Actions Relating to the EOC:
1. Once the EOC was activated and staffed, staff members gathered information from units in the field. This information gave City leadership a better idea of events within the City and aided their decision-making.

Areas for Improving the use of the EOC:
1. The EOC should have been activated and adequately staffed before the start of the protest.

Recommendations to Improve the Effectiveness of the EOC:
1. Before any major event or protests relating to high-profile incidents in the City of Cleveland, there should be a discussion between CDP, Cleveland Office of Emergency Management, and the Director of Public Safety to determine if the EOC should be activated to support the event. (IMPLEMENTED)

Communications

Roll Call
The IC held a roll call in the Community Room of the Third District at 1 p.m.

Positive Actions Relating to Roll Call:
1. Before deployment, most resources had a representative at roll call.
2. Members received their assignments and received a clear and concise message of what the deployment procedures were and their expectations from them and their officers.

Recommendations to Improve the Effectiveness of Roll Call:
1. Require at least one supervisor from every District and Unit assigned to the detail to attend roll call. Roll call will act as an information-sharing platform for all assigned personnel. (IMPLEMENTED)
2. Review the use of force guidelines contained in the Crowd Management General Police Order. (IMPLEMENTED)

Field Communications
Positive Actions Identified Related to Field Communications:
1. All MFF and Bike Group officers had their city-issued radios and in-earpieces.
2. Officers were given clear and concise information at the beginning of the protest and when they went mobile.
3. Individual channels worked well during the increasing influx of protestors. Information was being passed internally via radio, phone, and text amongst select units.
Areas to Improve Field Communications:

1. As the patrol section began to arrive at the now violent protest, they could not hear instructions over the loud environment because they did not have in-earpieces for their radios. MFF officers had a hard time hearing command and Intel due to the noise. Additionally, officers that wore their Gas Masks had a hard time hearing and talking.

2. Passing information from Intelligence to field officers was challenging initially, especially when using multiple platforms of communication. Undercover officers were not aware of uniformed officer movements and planned tactics and did not have access to the equipment to have better situational awareness. To improve their situational awareness, undercover officers might need equipment such as hidden microphones, earpieces and binoculars.

3. As the protest grew and more officers arrived, the communication channel became overwhelmed, causing some officers not to communicate with CCS.

Recommendations to Improve Field Communication:

1. Streamline communication channels and assign an officer to monitor and coordinate the information coming from the field to the dispatcher. The officer will be relay information to the field officers for better situational awareness. Advise officers to utilize the radio earpiece in crowd control environments. (IMPLEMENTED)

2. All assigned undercover officers (UC) should have access to an encrypted channel specific to each district with capabilities to remain undetected by protestors. (IMPLEMENTED)

3. Build into the EAP multiple communication channels. (IMPLEMENTED)

Deployment of Personnel & Equipment

Mutual Aid

Positive Actions Identified Related to Mutual Aid:

1. The Westshore Enforcement Bureau (WEB), Eastern Department Group Enforcement (EDGE) and the Southwest Enforcement Bureau (SEB) responded and had seamless communications with the Cleveland Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit. Their coordination is a product of frequent and rigorous cross-training.

2. Outside agency field forces were able to deploy in small areas around the Justice Center quickly.

Areas to Improve Mutual Aid Deployments:

1. Due to the delay in notification, deployment of WEB, SEB, and EDGE was not as rapid as expected.

Recommendations to Improve Mutual Aid Deployments:

Brief our partner agencies on large events as soon as possible, which will allow reaction time if a request for assistance is needed.
Division Personnel

Positive Actions Identified Relating to Division Personnel Deployment:
1. The EAP had a predetermined staging area. As personnel checked in, the IC was updated.
2. Additionally, many members of CDP volunteered to come into work to support their fellow officers and protect the citizens of the City of Cleveland.
3. Command level decisions were given and followed without hesitation concerning munition deployment, force, and MFF tactics.

Areas to Improve Division Personnel Deployment:
1. The activation of Division personnel was timely but can be more organized
2. Division personnel from the Districts did not know where the staging area was before leaving the district. The staging area was challenging to access due to protestors blocking the entrance. There was no secondary staging area. Some personnel arrived at the staging area without PPE.
3. Grenadier teams had to walk through hostile crowds to access the hot zone.

Recommendations to Improve Division Personnel Deployment:
1. Use the Code Red System to activate personnel to expedite deployment time.
2. Ensure that there is adequate transportation available to transport personnel, PPE and munitions packs. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Deploy Grenadiers teams of three, have a predetermined ingress, and be afforded additional layers of security while in transit to the hot zone.

Equipment

Positive Actions Related to Equipment:
1. Field Force members utilized ColdFire brand extinguishers several times to extinguish and stop the spread of fires.
2. The Kevlar helmets and face shields protected officers from concrete, rocks, glass bottles and other projectiles.
3. The PPE gear protected officers from blunt force trauma.

Areas to Improve Equipment:
1. Some officers had PPE Gear that did not fit them properly.
2. The PPE chest protector did not fit over the commonly worn ballistic vest.
3. More than 200 officers had not received training on the C50 Gas Mask System. Some officers were never fit-tested or had ill-fitting gas masks.
4. There was a shortage of riot shields and riot batons.
5. There was no standard operating procedure that governs how to deploy with the associated gear and incorporate light and heavy gear protocols.

Recommendations to Improve Equipment:
1. Conduct a Division-wide inventory of PPE gear and ensure that all members have PPE that fits them. Additionally, ensure that all members receive updated training on PPE and be issued the respective equipment.
2. Inspect each officer’s PPE gear to ensure inventory, proper fit and serviceability. Require immediate supervisors to conduct this inspection during the quarterly equipment review.
3. Issue and fit test all recruits for the C50 gas masks during the academy. Establish a division-wide fit testing schedule as well as proper use and maintenance training.
4. Purchase additional riot batons and riot shields.
**Munitions**

**Positive Actions Associated with Munitions:**

1. In anticipation of the 2016 RNC, the Division purchased a large number of munitions. Fortunately, except for training, no munitions were deployed. As such, the Division was prepared with munitions and they were available.
2. Initially, members of the Division received munitions training for the 2016 RNC. Additional training was provided in early 2020 to the current MFF with plans to continue practice moving forward. The Training Section postponed the training due to COVID-19.
3. When used as intended, they were effective.

**Areas to Improve Munitions Deployment and Tracking**

1. The storage, distribution and replenishment plans for munitions were inadequate once civil unrest commenced. Once the violence began and Ordnance Unit personnel were Grenadiers, the tracking of issued equipment became secondary, making it challenging to track equipment and personnel. The original plans for the Ordnance Unit members have always been to be the supply line for the munitions.
2. When the Ordnance Unit arrived, there was no predetermined route to get to the line causing them to walk through the protestors. Ultimately, they were escorted to the frontline and through the crowd by Bureau of Community Relations Logistics Officers. Once able to depart for replenishments, the vehicle in use by the Ordnance Unit was immediately attacked with hard objects causing damage and broken windows. Due to this aggression and the size of the crowd, the Ordnance Unit could not retrieve extra munitions from the vehicles.
3. Personnel assigned to a particular Unit does not mean they are necessarily available to be detailed to the munitions team. The Ordnance Unit has members assigned to other "on-call" units such as the Bomb Squad. As such, it becomes challenging to determine where individuals should be under these types of circumstances leading to a situation where one of the units will be deficient in personnel if the member is working with the other.
4. Grenadiers were not deployed in 3 person teams as planned, and initially, there were not enough grenadiers to handle the immediate need for munitions.
5. The Division only has ten launchers. Before this event, there was no need to buy more because all equipment issued for other events was turned back in at the end of every shift. However, once officers were given equipment for this event, it stayed out with the teams that had it. As a result, additional launchers were needed to ensure proper coverage. Eventually, all equipment was ordered to be returned.
6. The extra supplies were stored in vehicles away from the area for safekeeping. This distance created problems when replenishments were needed. The munitions were not secure and, in turn, vulnerable to destruction or theft. There were not enough Ordnance Unit personnel to ensure the vehicle-based munition caches were protected continuously.
7. Initially, most members on the scene holding the line or operating as grenadiers responded without PPE. Some did not have it issued to them, causing problems with contaminating them when chemical munitions were deployed.
Recommendations to Improve Munition Deployment:
1. Ensure enough trained grenadiers are deployed to permit the Ordnance Unit personnel to remain in control of the munitions tracking. Create a manual that includes policies and procedures for munitions storage, staging, issuance, etc.
2. When the IC deploys Grenadiers to a scene, the Operations Chief shall determine possible ingress and egress for deployment and provide an escort when appropriate.
3. Identify dedicated CDP members for MFF and grenadier duties, but all members of the Division should be provided with MFF familiarity training to include the use of munitions. Additionally, determine where members who are "crossed trained" will be deployed under these types of circumstances.
4. Train more officers to become Grenadier Operators. (IMPLEMENTED)
5. Purchase more launchers.
6. Ensure that Ordnance Unit officers remain as the supply line and not as grenadiers. (IMPLEMENTED)
7. Require all members responding to this type of situation to have, at a minimum, a gas mask and helmet.

Vehicles

Positive Actions Related to Vehicle Deployment:
1. Members were able to respond to those areas that were most affected by the protest.
2. With the aid of the Department of Public Works, officers used several 15 seat passenger vans to transport members of the MFF and Arrest teams to areas that they were needed.
3. Once the Bike group went mobile, they got to locations easier than motor vehicles and cleared protesters from areas.

Identified Opportunities to Improve Vehicle Deployment:
1. The vehicles used were useful in our efforts but challenging to deploy while wearing the PPE. These vehicles could only carry about eight members of an MFF at a time.
2. Once rioters damaged property and glass scattered across the Street and sidewalks, it became challenging for the Bike Group to move to different locations. The Bike Group has one High-Top van to carry gear, equipment, and supplies. To get to the desired locations, they must ride their bike to them and back, adding to their fatigue during prolonged engagements.

Areas to Improve Vehicle Deployments:
1. Use/acquire vehicles that can comfortably transport an entire MFF team. The vehicle(s) should protect from projectiles and allow the officers to be transported while wearing their gear.
2. Use/acquire a large vehicle(s) dedicated to the Bicycle group to transport its personnel, gear, and bicycles to lessen fatigue on the officers and reduce equipment damage, especially if there is a long transit to the area of operations.

Logistics

The Bureau of Community Relations (BCR) became the Logistics Team for the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC). BCR members were responsible for ensuring that officers were housed, fed, and hydrated. The idea of dedicating officers to this task came from recommendations from other departments that hosted large scale events. There were several reasons for this endeavor. The most important is the physical (heat-related illnesses) and mental (stamina and self-control) officers’ well-being. The first deployment happened approximately one month before the convention during the Cleveland Cavs parade. Since the RNC, BCR responsibility in this capacity increased to include equipment and gear.
The MFF Commander notified the BCR that it would deploy as logistics (food, hydration equipment) the day before the event. The BCR does not have a budget that allows for the immediate purchasing of such items. Therefore, an Emergency Purchase Order for food, hydration, and supplies was created. The initial order was for $5,000 and later increased to $10,000. This process requires that items are purchased then reimbursed. Additionally, five Gators were secured from the Division of Fire to transport the items.

On the day of the event, the MFF Commander tasked the BCR with being the Mobile Extraction Team. The Mobile Extraction Team removes injured officers from harm’s way and transports them to a predetermined location. The Division never deployed officers in this capacity before, and therefore, BCR members created an impromptu process.

As the events of the day unfolded, the BCR Commander determined that their building needed protection and dedicated officers to provide security. During the day and continuing throughout the week, several masked individuals were seen taking videos and photographs of the building and vehicles. As a result, officers provided over-watch on the roof and patrolled the interior floors and parking lots.

**Positive Actions Identified for Logistics:**

1. The Gators were invaluable. They allowed for officers to quickly maneuver around protestors to deliver food, hydration, and supplies.
2. Donations: Several of our community partners donated food, water, and Gatorade. The donations helped to lessen the financial burden and eased the logistical burden concerning picking up the supplies.
3. Personnel: Every available officer that was called-in responded and worked the detail.
4. Experience: From the standpoint of providing food and hydration, BCR personnel are becoming more efficient. Ultimately, they offer mobile food service. They learned from the lessons from the RNC and MLB All-Star week and provided various foods after the first day.
5. While the BCR did not extract any officers that were injured, they assisted the Grenadiers to the frontline and provided an extra presence throughout the week during protests. The team also transported a bike officer and his bike after blowing a tire during a protest.

**Identified Opportunities to Improve Logistics:**

1. The Gators are modified to fit the needs of the Division of Fire and were challenging to store more substantial items in the rear cargo area. Additionally, the BCR cannot keep the gators inside and away from inclement weather.
2. On the day of the riot, BCR was unable to track the locations of all of the officers. They also did not have an accurate daily account of the number of officers assigned to the detail. As a result, it was problematic to replenish them and accurately plan for the officers’ needs.
3. The current process for purchasing items require officers to pool money and collect receipts.
4. There was a large donation of pizza. The pizza was delivered simultaneously, and unfortunately, it had to sit until such time that it was feasible to deliver. Additionally, the BCR did not provide any additional food for the officers to select.
5. The BCR stored ice in the freezer of the Ice Cream Van. The freezer can only store up to eight bags of ice (20 pounds). As a result, ice was replenished several times throughout the day.

**Areas to Improve Logistics:**

1. Purchase/take control of five of the Division of Fires Gators and reconfigure the rear cargo area for storing large items. Take possession of two 30-foot cargo trailers and park them at the Logistics Team staging location. They will keep the Gators and extra equipment.
2. Dedicate personnel in the EOC or Command Bus to track officer locations and the number of them assigned to the detail. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Create a contract for water, Gatorade/Powerade and snacks. The agreement will cover a minimum amount purchased yearly. Use any extra for various deployments throughout the year.
4. Coordinate with vendors to create a staggered delivery schedule. (IMPLEMENTED)
5. Purchase an ice chest.

Reports & Inspections

In 2016, the CDP dedicated supervisors assigned to the Inspections and Internal Affairs Units to record and investigate uses of force during the 2016 RNC. The idea of committing supervisors for this task came from lessons learned from large-scale events from other cities. The supervisors will not be directly involved with the deployment but would observe from the periphery and conduct the investigations when needed.

Use of Force Reporting

Positive Actions Identified for Uses of Force Reporting:
1. Officers understood the precise use of force guidelines.
2. When officers used force, injuries to citizens were minor or non-existent.
3. The munitions team acted within their training and used munitions effectively as a crowd control measure.
4. The use of two direct impact sponge rounds successfully stopped the crowd from using rocks and debris thrown at officers.

Identified Opportunities to Improve Uses of Force Reporting:
Members were waiting on the order to use force and how to deploy to effect an arrest effectively. When officers made an arrest and used force, they were unsure of the reporting procedures. Since this was civil unrest, some members did not know what force could be used to either effect an arrest or to disperse a crowd. When officers deployed munitions, there was confusion about how and when to report the use of munitions.

Areas to Improve Uses of Force Reporting:
Update the current crowd management policy to include the use of force and munitions reporting and deployment. Create a distinction, code, or color, which will advise officers on force policy to operate.

Injuries

Positive Actions Identified for Reporting Injuries:
None Identified.

Identified Areas to Improve Injury Reporting:
1. Members may have been injured and did not report it.
2. Supervisors did not utilize WCS to document officer injuries.
3. There was no designated safety team to handle injuries.
Recommendations to Improve the Reporting of injuries:
1. During the demobilization, supervisors will observe all officers and document any sustained injuries.
2. Update the crowd management GPO to state supervisors will document officer injuries using their WCS when no other option is available.
3. Implementation of designated safety officers assigned to the Incident Command. (IMPLEMENTED)

Property Damage Mitigation

Positive Actions Identified with Mitigation of Damage to Property:
1. Despite violent acts of property damage and arson, the deployment of Cold fire extinguishers reduced the damage level to vehicles and structures.
2. The decision not to attempt to put out the fires of the zone cars kept both officers and firefighters from sustaining injuries.

Identified Opportunities to Improve Mitigation of Property Damage:
1. Many stores were set on fire, looted, or vandalized and there was uncertainty on how to document the damage.
2. The Bike Group is a mobile unit. However, they were static at the Justice Center, unable to leave until relieved by an MFF. As such, they were unable to suppress some property damage.

Areas to Improve Mitigation of Property Damage:
1. Assign a team of officers to walk affected areas after rioters leave the site. The responsibility of this team will be to make contact with store owners, take reports and photos of the damage for evidentiary purposes. (IMPLEMENTED)
2. Increase the number of MFF officers to immediately replace a static Bike Group. (IMPLEMENTED)

Arrests & Booking

Arresting multiple individuals during a large-scale event is challenging. The most significant challenge is transportation and report writing. Throughout the day and night, officers arrested dozens of offenders.

Positive Arrest/Booking Actions Identified:
1. CDP designated booking teams before the scheduled event.
2. The CCSO prisoner bus was available for transport.

Identified Areas for Improving the Arrest/Booking Process:
1. Undercover Officers embedded with protestors often could not arrest violent agitators because there was no available Arrest Team or vehicle.
2. There was confusion in matching arrested offenders with the arresting officer, thereby complicating the booking process.
3. Officers did not complete timely arrest reports.
4. There was confusion in the booking process as it relates to proper charges and efficiency.

Areas for Improving the Arrest/Booking Process:
1. Create designated mobile arrest teams to assist undercovers, Bike Group, and MFF. (IMPLEMENTED)
2. Create a process that matches the arrested offender with the arresting offender. (IMPLEMENTED)
3. Mandate officers to complete reports as time permits or during the demobilization process. (IMPLEMENTED)
4. Place a representative from the Prosecutor’s Office at the booking area. (IMPLEMENTED)
Officer Safety & Wellness

Positive Actions Identified for Officer Safety & Wellness:

1. As previously stated, dedicating officers to the task of providing food and hydration helped to maintain their mental and physical well-being. All officers assigned to the detail were able to eat at least once but had constant hydration (water and Gatorade).
2. No officers that were assigned to the detail that day suffered from any heat-related illnesses.
3. There were no serious physical injuries to officers.
4. As stated previously, there had not been any large scale civil unrest in the City since the 1960s. As such, no current CDP officer has had experience dealing with an incident of this magnitude. During the day, officers of all ranks displayed leadership and provided support for one another as they managed the crisis in front of them.

Areas to Improve Officer Safety & Wellness:

On the day of the event, there was limited ability to take breaks for food, water or rest.

Recommendations to Improve Officer Safety & Wellness:

Ensure the Safety Officer and Employee Assistance Unit are deployed to monitor officer wellness during and after the event, along with peer support members when available. The safety officer will monitor the wellness of officers on the detail and ensure officers take breaks. (IMPLEMENTED)
CONCLUSION

The Division of Police faithfully protects the rights of all citizens, particularly those wishing to assemble peacefully and express their constitutional rights. The Division is also committed to building relationships and partnerships with all community stakeholders. The original Event Action Plan for the May 30th protest was a mixture of intelligence gathered from law enforcement sources and community members, including consideration of past events and the balancing of protecting individuals’ constitutional rights versus the Division’s need to be visible and provide general safety.

While this report does not provide every detail or an answer to every possible question, we hope that the information contained herein will provide the community and other law enforcement agencies with a better understanding of the challenges on May 30th and drive positive changes for the Division. Civil unrest continues to occur through our country, demanding a commitment to improved community outreach, training, and equipment. By calling for this after-action review, the Cleveland Division of Police demonstrates its willingness to learn from its response to civil unrest with a desire to provide the best response possible.

Unfortunately, as in many large municipal areas in the country, large groups of nefarious individuals would converge to cities to disrupt and destroy an otherwise peaceful gathering. There was a loss of three police zone cars and numerous government vehicles. According to the arrests records from that night, there were 70 arrests, including three juvenile arrests resulting from the civil unrest downtown. Fortunately, there was no loss of life to either law enforcement personnel or the public.
EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A – NEORFC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS

Sent on Thursday, May 28th, 2020

Good Morning,
The following information was derived from open source and public facing social media:

"I Can't Breathe" Justice for George Floyd
When: Saturday 05/30/2020 at 1:00pm – 5:00pm
Where: Cleveland Free Stamp (Lakeside Avenue/Willard Park)
Attendance: 230 going: 163 interested (social media event page)
Note: This event is being organized by Black Lives Matter Cleveland, the Coalition to Stop the Inhumanity at the Cuyahoga County Jail, and Suries for Young People. The purpose of this event is to call for justice in the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The event will also serve as a call for justice for Desmond Franklin who was involved in a police use of force case in Cleveland. No disruptive tactics or actions are being called for by organizers. Social media discussion within the event page was limited/low volume; this has previously been an indicator of turnout.

Dissemination: Cleveland Command Staff, Cuyahoga County Sheriff; Downtown LE Partners

** The NEORFC is providing the above information, some of which refers to first amendment protected activities, for situational awareness, operational planning, and in the interest of assuring the safety and security of the demonstrators, public, and law enforcement officers.

Sent on Friday, May 29th, 2020

Good Morning,
The following information was derived from open source and public facing social media. This information is being disseminated to a limited group of individuals who have law enforcement responsibility in the downtown business district or need to know as the information affects their operations. These unique subject files are updated frequently; however, events of this nature have been infrequent since the RNC. If this email has been forwarded to you and you have a need to know, or the events impact your operations, do not hesitate to contact the NEORFC and request to be added to the dissemination list. The events and threat environment are ever changing and the NEORFC wants to include all partners in sharing this information.

"I Can't Breathe" Justice for George Floyd
When: Saturday 05/30/2020 at 1:00pm – 5:00pm (event starts at 1:00pm)
Where: Cleveland Free Stamp (Lakeside Avenue/Willard Park); unknown march route
Attendance: 487 going: 378 interested (social media event page)
Note: This event is being organized by Black Lives Matter Cleveland, the Coalition to Stop the Inhumanity at the Cuyahoga County Jail, and Suries for Young People. The purpose of this event is to call for justice in the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The event will also serve as a call for justice for Desmond Franklin who was involved in a police use of force case in Cleveland. No disruptive tactics or actions are being called for by organizers. Organizers specifically mention they are intent on organizing and maintaining a peaceful demonstration, and maintaining social distancing. Organizers are sharing information (not attached) on staying safe during a protest; this indicates a perception by organizers of an aggressive police response, or insertion of police "implants" in the past information like this has been shared and not resulted in violent or disruptive activities.

Over the past 24 hours social media activity for this event has increased. This is likely due to actions in Columbus that resulted in individuals entering the statehouse and breaking windows. Organizers mention a march will occur, but no route is available on open source or public facing social media. Individuals are being asked to arrive at 1:30pm to sign in and receive PPE, and follow the instructions of black leadership. The NEORFC has no intelligence to indicate counter demonstration activity at this point. We will continue to update as information warrants.

Dissemination: Cleveland Command Staff, Cuyahoga County Sheriff; Downtown LE Partners

** The NEORFC is providing the above information, some of which refers to first amendment protected activities, for situational awareness, operational planning, and in the interest of assuring the safety and security of the demonstrators, public, and law enforcement officers.

Sent on Friday, May 29th, 2020

Good Morning,
The following information was derived from open source and public facing social media.

** Individuals will be marching from Lakeside Ave to Justice Center along Lakeside Ave. Both individuals on foot and by car will be utilizing this route and will follow behind marchers.

"I Can't Breathe" Justice for George Floyd
When: Saturday 05/30/2020 at 1:00pm – 5:00pm (event starts at 1:00pm)
Where: Cleveland Free Stamp (Lakeside Avenue/Willard Park); march to Justice Center
Attendance: 1,000 going: 456 interested (social media event page)
Note: This event is being organized by Black Lives Matter Cleveland, the Coalition to Stop the Inhumanity at the Cuyahoga County Jail, and Suries for Young People. The purpose of this event is to call for justice in the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The event will also serve as a call for justice for Desmond Franklin who was involved in a police use of force case in Cleveland. No disruptive tactics or actions are being called for by organizers. Organizers specifically mention they are intent on organizing and maintaining a peaceful demonstration, and maintaining social distancing. Organizers are sharing information (not attached) on staying safe during a protest; this indicates a perception by organizers of an aggressive police response, or insertion of police "implants". This perception has been reinforced by the Minnesota governor's claims that the violence is being caused by white supremacists and cartel that have infiltrated the demonstrations. The past information like this has been shared and not resulted in violent or disruptive activities.

Over the past 24 hours social media activity for this event has increased. This is likely due to actions in Columbus on Thursday night, and continuing violence/not in major cities across the United States on Friday Night. Organizers indicate a march (unknown start) will take place along Lakeside Ave with a final destination at the Justice Center. Individuals are being asked to arrive at 1:00pm to sign in and receive PPE, and to follow the instructions of black leadership for the duration of the event. The NEORFC also has no intelligence to indicate counter demonstration activity at this point. We will continue to update as information warrants.

Dissemination: Cleveland Command Staff, Cuyahoga County Sheriff; Downtown LE Partners

** The NEORFC is providing the above information, some of which refers to first amendment protected activities, for situational awareness, operational planning, and in the interest of assuring the safety and security of the demonstrators, public, and law enforcement officers.
EXHIBIT B – DISPERSAL ORDER

DISPERSAL ORDER (Appendix A):

The below listed warning format is printed here for reference, and is to be used when preparing to make arrests in conjunction with mass demonstrations. The information contained in any warnings that are given in mass arrest incidents must be documented and retained for reporting requirements and notifications.

Warnings should be given with a bullhorn or a police PA system, (preferably by the Incident Commander) in a loud and clear manner. When feasible, members of the intelligence unit shall videotape the reading of the dispersal order from the furthest vantage point away from the sound amplification device to document that all protesters could hear the warnings. (The officer recording the message shall notify the supervisor giving the warning that the message was audible and clear)

OFFICIAL DISPERSAL COMMAND:

I am (rank / name), a sworn police officer for the City of Cleveland. I hereby declare this to be an unlawful assembly, and command all those assembled here to immediately leave. If you do not do so, you may be arrested or subject to other police action. Section 605.02 of the Cleveland Codified Ordinances prohibits remaining present at an unlawful assembly. If you remain in the area just described, regardless of your purpose, you will be in violation of this section. The following routes of dispersal are available (describe available exit areas). You have ______ minutes to leave. If you refuse to move, you will be arrested.

(ADD TO LAST WARNING ONLY)  This is your final warning

Day: ____________ Date: __ / __ / ______ Location: ________________

1st Warning ______:_______ (Wait :05 minutes before reading 2nd warning)
2nd Warning ______:_______ (Wait :02 minutes before reading 3rd warning)
3rd Warning ______:_______ (Commence making arrests)
EXHIBIT C – PROCLAMATION OF CIVIL EMERGENCY

Issued May 30, 2020

CITY OF CLEVELAND
Mayor Frank G. Jackson

PROCLAMATION OF CIVIL EMERGENCY
(Civil Unrest)

RECIPIENT

1. Commencing at 8:00 p.m. on May 30, 2020 and continuing to 8:00 a.m. on May 31, 2020, and commencing at 8:00 p.m. on May 31, 2020, and continuing to 8:00 a.m. on June 1, 2020, the citizens of the City of Cleveland are experiencing a civil emergency due to violence and unrest.

2. The problems experienced as a result of this situation endanger the health, safety, and welfare of persons and property within the City of Cleveland and potentially hinder the execution of the ordinances of the City, the laws of the State of Ohio and of the United States.

PROCLAMATION

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Frank G. Jackson, Mayor of the City of Cleveland, under and by the virtue of the authority vested in me by the Ohio Constitution, the Charter and laws of the City of Cleveland do hereby proclaim that a State of Civil Emergency exists within the City of Cleveland due to violence and unrest.

A. AREA AFFECTED BY THIS PROCLAMATION

I hereby proclaim that the Central Business District within the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland, as shown on the attached map, is covered by this proclamation.

B. DECLARATION OF CURFEW

Within the Area, a curfew is hereby proclaimed commencing at 8 pm on May 30, 2020 and continuing as stated above or upon the issuance of a proclamation by the Mayor that a Civil Emergency no longer exists, whichever occurs first. All persons are prohibited from walking, running, loitering, standing or motoring, (except for vehicles on Route 2; I-77; I-71 and I-90)
upon any alley, street, highway, public property or vacant premises within the Area, excepting persons officially designated by the Mayor to perform duties with reference to the Civil Emergency, persons travelling to and from their residence located within the Area or a place of refuge, medical care and/or safety should they be unable for reasons of health or safety to remain in their residence, and persons traveling to and from their place of employment during regular business hours. All persons are asked to remain within their residences during the curfew unless remaining in their residences could constitute a risk to health or safety.

C. **BUSINESS CLOSING**

All businesses and places of employment located within the Area are urged to close their business during the hours for which a curfew has been proclaimed.

D. **LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE**

All regular and auxiliary law enforcement agencies and organizations within and without the City of Cleveland are encouraged to assist in preserving the peace within the City of Cleveland by coordinating activities with Federal, State, and local health officials.

E. **DURATION OF CIVIL EMERGENCY**

The State of Civil Emergency proclaimed pursuant to this proclamation shall terminate as stated above or upon the issuance of a proclamation by the Mayor that a Civil Emergency no longer exists, whichever occurs first.

I, Frank G. Jackson, Mayor of the City of Cleveland, State of Ohio, affix my signature to this Proclamation this □□□□ day of □□□□□□□□□□, 2020, at □□□□ o'clock a.m./p.m.

[Signature]
Frank G. Jackson
Mayor
EXHIBIT D – MAP OF DOWNTOWN CLEVELAND
REFERENCES


https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2017/05/protesters_arrested_after_acqu.html

https://www.fema.gov/incident-command-system-resources


